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Non-technical summary: This paper analyses whether wages in Germany respond to …rm-speci…c pro…tability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to …rm-speci…c rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector-speci…c wage agreements, …rm-speci…c wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Theoretical considerations lead us to expect the sensitivity of wages to …rm-speci…c rents to be larger under …rm-speci…c contracts than in non-covered …rms. The same is likely to hold for industry-wide agreements, provided the bargaining parties make use of ‡exibility provisions, which recently have become a widespread element of central wage agreements. Since direct information on the use of ‡exibility provisions in …rms subject to an industry-wide wage agreement is unavailable, we take our empirical …ndings as an indirect test of whether the use of such provisions is a quantitatively important phenomenon in Germany.
Using linked employer-employee data from the mining and manufacturing sector, our empirical analysis o¤ers a remarkably consistent picture: We …nd evidence that individual wages are positively related to …rm-speci…c quasi-rents, but this appears to be con…ned to the non-union sector and to …rm-speci…c contracts. Industry-wide wage agreements, in contrast, appear to suppress rent-sharing at the …rm level. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe¢ cient of zero. Di¤erenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our pro…tability measure even point to a negative relationship between wages and …rm-speci…c pro…tability under centralised contracts. This leads us to conclude that the lower responsiveness of wages to …rm-speci…c conditions under centralised contracts is not simply due to a downward-bias caused by the endogeneity of quasi-rents. In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the wage-pro…t relationship, our …ndings therefore suggest that centralised wage bargaining suppresses any positive responsiveness of wages to di¤erent pro…tability conditions, and that the use of ‡exibility provisions in central wage agreements appears to be empirically negligible. To reconcile this result with the fact that a considerable fraction of …rms covered by a collective contract pay wages above the going rate, we conclude from our …ndings that such wages do not result from di¤erences in pro…tability conditions, but rather re ‡ect observable and unobservable di¤erences in worker quality.
Introduction
A central question in the economics of wage determination is to what extent wage differentials re ‡ect di¤erences in worker characteristics or di¤erences across employers' for identical workers. With regard to the latter, …rm-speci…c pro…tability conditions have been widely recognised as a major source of employer-speci…c wage di¤erentials. The existing literature o¤ers competing explanations for a positive relationship between wages and …rms' ability to pay, such as short-run frictions in a competitive labour market, e¢ ciency wage mechanisms and union power. An empirical test of a positive wage-pro…t correlation is generally seen as an indirect test of the competitive labour market theory, since the latter is di¢ cult to reconcile with a long-run correlation between wages and pro…ts (see e.g., Blanch ‡ower et al. 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997) .
A large number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of pro…tability conditions on wages. Early studies date back to Slichter (1950) who reports a positive correlation between wages and employers' ability to pay using industry data from U.S. manufacturing. Later work on inter-industry wage di¤erentials documents persistent wage di¤erentials across industries that appear to be correlated with industry-pro…ts (Dickens and Katz 1987 , Krueger and Summers 1988 , Katz and Summers 1989 and Blanch ‡ower et al. 1996 . Most of this work controls for systematic worker di¤erences across industries by using individual data which are matched to industry-speci…c pro…tability measures. However, in relying on aggregate pro…t data those studies typically fail to account for a within-industry correlation between …rm pro…ts and wages. Studies using …rm-level data overcome this problem, but in general do not control for worker quality (e.g., van Reenen 1996, Hildreth and Oswald 1997, Dobbelaere 2004) . Given that one is generally interested in the question of whether identical workers obtain higher wages in more pro…table …rms, an ideal data set would include linked information on both employers and employees. With this information at hand, it would be possible to account for non-random sorting of high quality workers into more pro…table …rms. Moreover, linked employer-employee data do also allow to control for unobserved worker and …rm heterogeneity, as long as they are available in a longitudinal dimension. To date, there are only few studies investigating the wage-pro…t relationship using matched worker-…rm data. Examples include Margolis and Salvanes (2001) , Arai (2003) , Kramarz (2003) , Nekby (2003) as well as Martins (2004) .
The primary objective of our paper is to explore the linkages between …rm-speci…c pro…ts and individual wages using German linked employer-employee data. Partic-ular attention will be paid to the question as to whether the sensitivity of wages to …rm-speci…c pro…ts depends on collective bargaining coverage. In pursuing the issue of labor market institutions, our paper is related to a second strand of literature, which emphasises the role of the bargaining structure for the magnitude of inter-industry wage di¤erentials. Based on cross-country comparisons, Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) , Edin and Zetterberg (1992) and Kahn (1998) …nd countries with highly centralised and coordinated bargaining institutions to exhibit substantially lower inter-industry wage variation than countries with relatively decentralised bargaining systems. Our paper di¤ers from this literature, in that we (1) focus on inter…rm wage di¤erentials and (2) exploit intra-instead of international variations in the bargaining structure. 1 The German case provides an instructive example for the co-existence of di¤erent bargaining structures. Until the early 1990s, wage determination was dominated by centralised wage bargaining between industry-speci…c unions and employers'associations. However, in the last decade, there has been a tendency towards decentralisation of wage determination, since …rm-speci…c collective wage agreements as well as wage determination without any bargaining coverage have become more important (Hassel 1999 , Ochel 2005 . Even within centralised industry agreements, there have been numerous attempts to allow for more (downward) ‡exibility of wages by introducing opening and hardship clauses. Moreover, since bargained wages in centralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages, there is also su¢ cient room for upward ‡exibility. Given that recent decentralisation tendencies have introduced -at least formally -the possibility to adjust wages to local conditions at the …rm level, a further purpose of the paper is to shed light on the following questions: Do …rm-speci…c contracts and ‡exibility provisions in centralised industry agreements allow for rent-sharing at the …rm level? If yes, does the extent to which wages respond to pro…ts di¤er from that in …rms without any bargaining coverage? Moreover, linked employer-employee data also allow us to address the question as to whether certain groups of workers bene…t more from …rms'ability-to-pay than others. There are only few previous studies on the relationship between wages and pro…ts in Germany and, to our knowledge, there is no study that uses matched worker-…rm data. Hübler and König (1998) and Klodt (2000) use data from the 'Hannover Establishment Panel'. They report a signi…cant positive impact of pro…ts on average …rm wages, but do not allow the e¤ect to vary with bargaining coverage. In own recent work, we use data from the IAB Establishment Panel and …nd wages to be positively related to establishment-pro…ts. However, this appears to be true only for non-covered establishments, since we fail to detect any positive relationship between wages and local pro…tability conditions in plants that are subject to a collective wage agreementirrespective of whether the agreement is industry-or …rm-speci…c (Gürtzgen 2005) . However, like any other analysis using such aggregate data, these results are subject to the limitations of establishment-or …rm-level data. First, there may be unobserved worker heterogeneity, which is unlikely to be fully captured by establishment level data. Second, aggregate data generally provide a rather crude measure of wages. The IAB Establishment Panel only o¤ers information on the reported wagebill exclusive of fringe-bene…ts or bonus payments. Whenever rent-sharing takes the form of such supplemental payments, the use of these data will clearly entail an understatement of the true wage-pro…t relationship.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between wages and pro…tability using the IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set (LIAB) which combines data from the Employment Statistics Register and the IAB Establishment Panel. This data set is especially useful for our purposes since it enables us to match individual data with establishment-speci…c information on value added and collective bargaining coverage. A particular advantage is the exact information on earnings due to the administrative nature of the Employment Statistics Register. In our estimation strategy, we …rst focus on simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimates. The OLS estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modi…ed in various respects. First, we will address the possibility of unobserved individual time invariant factors. Second, we will consider both establishment-and individual-level unobserved heterogeneity by estimating di¤erenced spell …xed-e¤ects models. A …nal problem concerns the endogeneity of our pro…tability measure, since wages and pro…ts are simultaneously determined. To address this problem, we will instrument pro…ts by using a di¤erenced GMM-estimator according to Arellano and Bond (1991) .
The main results can be summarised as follows: We …nd evidence that individual wages are positively related to local pro…tability conditions. However, this seems to be true only for wage determination in the non-union sector and under …rm-speci…c contracts. For establishments covered by an industry-wide wage contract, pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents, but estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe¢ cient of zero. In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the wage-pro…t relationship, our …ndings therefore support the notion that centralised wage bargaining suppresses any positive responsiveness to local pro…tability conditions. Di¤erenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our prof-itability measure even point to a negative relationship between wages and …rm-speci…c pro…tability under centralised contracts. This leads us to conclude that the lower responsiveness of wages to …rm-speci…c conditions under centralised contracts was not simply due to a downward-bias caused by the endogeneity of quasi-rents.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the institutional background is presented in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the general empirical model and derives testable hypotheses about the degree of rent-sharing under di¤erent bargaining setups. Section 4 describes the data set and the main variables used in the subsequent analysis. Section 5 presents the results from the pooled OLS, …xed-e¤ects and di¤erenced GMM estimations. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion and some conclusions.
2 Is there any scope for …rm-level rent-sharing in Germany?
The German system of wage bargaining is usually characterised as medium-centralised, with regional and industry-wide collective wage agreements (Flächentarifverträge) being the predominant form of wage determination (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988, Soskice 1990, OECD 2004). Such central wage agreements are negotiated between an industry-speci…c trade union and an employers'association. They are legally binding for all …rms being member of the respective employers' association and for all employees who are members of the trade union. Although the negotiated wage applies strictly speaking only to union members, member …rms generally extend the wage settlement to non-member employees as well. 2 Given the predominance of centralised wage bargaining, there appears to be little scope for …rm level rent-sharing in Germany. Yet, a closer look at German wage determination o¤ers a more subtle picture. Since the early 1990s, German industrial relations have experienced a clear tendency towards more decentralised forms of wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999, Kohaut and Schnabel 2003) . This tendency is caused by three major developments. First, …rm-speci…c collective wage agreements have become more frequent. Those agreements are negotiated between an individual …rm and industry-speci…c unions. Second, wage determination without any bargaining coverage is becoming more relevant. In …rms not being covered by a collective agreement wage determination may either take the form of individual wage contracts or of plant-speci…c agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) between works councils and the management. 3 Third, there is a tendency even within centralised wage agreements to allow for more ‡exibility at the …rm-level. In recent years, contractual opt-out clauses or hardship clauses have become a widespread element of central agreements. While opening clauses delegate issues that are usually speci…ed in the central agreement, such as working-time and pay-conditions, to the plant-level, hardship clauses enable …rms to be exempted from the centralised agreement if they are close to bankruptcy. In general, the adoption of such clauses requires the approval of the collective bargaining parties (Hassel 1999 , Ochel 2005 . Moreover, since bargained wages in centralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages, there is also su¢ cient room for upward ‡exibility. 4 To sum up, recent decentralisation tendencies in Germany have introduced -at least formally -the possibility to adjust wages to local conditions at the …rm level. However, at this point it is worthy to note that the question of whether this potential has really been exploited still remains to be answered empirically. For example, even though contractual opening and hardship clauses have become an important (formal) element of centralised agreements, empirical evidence on the use of such clauses is rather sparse. 5 
Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses
In order to quantify the relationship between wages of individual workers and their employers'ability-to-pay, we consider a wage equation taking the following form:
There are i = 1,..., N individuals, and N = P T i total worker-year observations. Since we will use individual data that are matched to establishment-level data, j(i; t) refers to the establishment which employs individual i at time t; with j = 1; :::; J: The dependent variable, ln w it ; is the individual log daily wage. The explanatory variable of main interest is j(i;t)t ; measuring (time-varying) establishment-speci…c per-capita pro…tability. 6 x 0 it represents a vector of time-varying individual covariates with a coe¢ cient vector , while u 0 i denotes a vector of individual time-constant characteristics with a coe¢ cient vector . Similarly, w 0 j(i;t)t and q 0 j(i;t) represent timevarying and time constant j level covariates with coe¢ cient vectors and : i and j(i;t) denote individual and establishment-speci…c unobserved heterogeneities. Finally, industry dummies are included to capture industry-speci…c factors, such as the overall level of industry demand and the degree of competition. Time dummies D t are included to capture common macroeconomic shocks, and it is a white-noise error term.
Since the emphasis of our analysis is on the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the sensitivity of wages to local pro…tability conditions, the coe¢ cient is speci…ed to depend on the contract-type:
where CEN T is a dummy taking the value of unity if an establishment is subject to an industry-wide collective wage contract and F IRM takes on the value of unity if an establishment is covered by a …rm-speci…c contract.
Bargaining power considerations suggest the sign of _F IRM to be positive, i.e. the sensitivity of wages to local pro…ts is likely to be larger under …rm-speci…c contracts than in non-covered establishments. An important argument is that …rm-speci…c contracts in Germany are concluded by industry-speci…c unions. This distinguishes German …rm-speci…c collective wage agreements from similar wage agreements in other countries, as e.g. in the U.K., where …rm-speci…c unions bargain independently from each other (see e.g. OECD 2004). For this reason, the bargaining power of works councils determining wages in non-covered establishments may be expected to be considerably lower than that of an industry-wide union, which determines wages under …rm-speci…c contracts. This prediction is re-enforced by the fact that the wage bargaining process under …rm-speci…c contracts is highly coordinated by an industry-wide union, whereas it is completely uncoordinated in non-covered plants. While wage-setting acteurs in non-covered plants have an incentive to cut wages in order to gain a larger share of industry-demand, this competitive mechanism completely disappears with an industry-union (see Gürtzgen 2005) . This leads us to expect an industry union to capture a larger share of rents under …rm-speci…c contracts than, say, works-councils in non-covered establishments.
The sign of _CEN T cannot be predicted a-priori, since this depends on the fraction of …rms making use of ‡exibility provisions in centralised wage agreements. Since our data lack explicit information on the use of such provisions, we will take our empirical …ndings as an indirect test of whether such provisions are really exploited. In this case, _CEN T might be expected to be positive (for the same reason as under …rm-speci…c contracts). Conversely, testing _CEN T = 0 provides a direct test of a complete invariance of wages against …rm/establishment-speci…c conditions. Note that a rationale for why unions might favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure could be workers'demand for income insurance. The idea that wage compression might provide insurance against income risk has been taken up by several authors. Horn and Svensson (1986) show that union contracts may help to enforce implicit contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral …rms facing uncertainties over the business-cycle. Agell and Lommerud (1992) interpret wage compression across di¤erent skill groups as insurance against ex-ante uncertainties over skill endowments. Burda (1995) takes this approach further and analyses unions'reactions to changes in the distribution of uncertainties. Note that in our context, intra-industry wage compression provides insurance against two dimensions of uncertainties. First, wage compression between …rms at a given point in time may reduce income risk if workers face uncertainties over the allocation to more or less pro…table …rms. Second, given that with a compressed intra-industry wage structure wage growth is likely to depend on changes in average sector performance, workers'wages in a given …rm should also be sheltered against ‡uctuations in …rm-level pro…tability over time.
Having derived hypotheses about the role of collective bargaining for the wage-pro…t relationship, it may also be useful to consider the importance of individual characteristics. The di¤erential e¤ects measured by the interaction terms ought to be particularly pronounced among those groups of workers who are likely to be covered by collective contracts. While our data contain information on collective bargaining coverage at the establishment level, they unfortunately lack explicit information on whether an individual worker is covered or not. There are a number of studies that analyse the determinants of individual union membership in Germany (e.g., Beck and Fitzenberger 2004, Goerke and Pannenberg 2004), but empirical evidence on individual collective bargaining coverage is rather scarce. 7 International empirical evidence suggests individual non-coverage to be particularly relevant among highskilled managerial workers (see e.g. Hartog et al. 2002a ). As a result, we expect the interaction e¤ects to be stronger for low-and medium-skilled blue-collar workers.
In non-covered establishments, a positive wage-pro…t correlation may result from the bargaining power of individuals and works councils on the one hand and from e¢ ciency wage mechanisms on the other hand. The latter give rise to a positive correlation between wages and pro…ts due to productivity enhancing e¤ects. Such e¤ects may arise, for example, from reductions in turnover and shirking (see e.g. Krueger and Summers 1988) . Thus, e¢ ciency wage considerations lead us to expect the wage-pro…t correlation to be particularly strong among the better educated, since those workers are more likely to accumulate …rm-speci…c human capital and are less likely to be supervised than low-skilled workers. This raises the relative incentive for employers to pay above market-clearing wages in order to reduce turnover and shirking. Note that the supervision argument should also hold for white-collar as compared to blue-collar workers. The same conclusions can be drawn in case of rentsharing as the result of individual wage bargaining power, because highly educated workers may be expected to have better outside options and higher bargaining power than low-skilled individuals. Finally, rent-sharing in non-covered establishments may also result from the bargaining power of works councils. Thus, the extent of rentsharing ought to be larger for those groups of workers whose wages are likely to be a¤ected by works-councils. Empirical evidence on the presence of works-councils generally suggests that the likelihood of codetermination increases with the share of male as well as skilled workers (see Addison et al. 1997 , Hübler and Jirjahn 2003 , Zwick 2004 ). This may be interpreted as a weak hint for wages of those groups being more likely to be in ‡uenced by works councils than those of female and low-skilled individuals.
Data and Variable Description
The empirical analysis uses the IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics Register. The IAB Establishment Panel is based on an annual survey of West-German establishments administered since 1993 by the research institute of the Federal Employment Services in Nuremberg (IAB -Institute of Employment Research). East German establishments entered the panel in 1996. The database is a representative sample of German establishments employing at least one employee who pays social security contributions. The survey data provide numerous information on es-tablishment structure and performance, as e.g. sales, the share of materials in sales and investment expenditures (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002) . Moreover, the data set contains information on whether an establishment is covered by an industry-wide collective wage agreement, a …rm-speci…c wage agreement or by no collective agreement at all.
The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register, which is an administrative panel data set of all employees paying social security contributions (see e.g. Bender et al. 2000) . The data are based on noti…cations which employers are obliged to provide for each employee covered by the social security system. Those noti…cations are required whenever an employment relationship begins or ends. In addition, there is at least one annual compulsory noti…cation for all employees who are employed on the 31 st December of each year. Due to its administrative nature, this database has the advantage of providing reliable information on daily earnings that are subject to social security contributions. The establishment and worker data sets contain a unique establishment identi…cation number. This allows us to match information on all employees covered by the social security system with the establishments in the IAB Establishment Panel.
The construction of the Linked Employer-Employee data set occurs in two steps: First, we select establishments from the establishment panel data set. From the available waves 1993 to 2001, we use the years 1995 to 2001, since detailed information on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Since information on a number of variables, as e.g. sales and the share of materials in total sales are gathered retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year. Moreover, we restrict our sample to establishments from the mining and manufacturing sector with at least two employees. We focus on these industries, since the introduction of opening and hardship clauses here has been particularly relevant in central collective wage agreements. These sectors therefore provide an particularly interesting case for testing the empirical relevance of the use of such clauses. As we will apply dynamic panel data methods, only establishments with consistent information on the variables of interest (described below) and at least three consecutive time series observations are included in our sample. This results in a sample of 843 establishments with 3,498 observations, yielding an unbalanced panel containing establishment-observations with, on average, 4.15 years of data. 8 In the second step, the establishment data are merged with noti…cations for all employees who are employed by the selected establishments on June 30 th of each year. From the worker data we drop observations for apprentices, part-time workers and homeworkers. To avoid modeling human capital formation and retirement decisions, we exclude individuals younger than 19 and older than 55. Moreover, since we consider only full-time workers, we eliminate those whose wage is less than twice the lower social security contribution limit. In order to be able to conduct …rst-di¤erencing, we consider only those individuals for whom at least two consecutive time series observations are available. The …nal sample comprises 333,045 individuals in 821 establishments, yielding an unbalanced panel containing 3,361 establishment years and 1,305,705 individual observations with, on average, 3.92 years of data for each worker. 9 The individual data include information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, nationality, employment status (blue-/white-collar), education (six categories) 10 and on the date of entry into the establishment. The latter is used to approximate tenure by subtracting the entry date from the ending date of the employer's noti…cation which is available from the worker data. Note, however, that this proxy does not account for potential employment interruptions which might have occurred during this time span.
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis will be the real gross daily wage. Since there is an upper contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are top-coded. In our sample, top-coding a¤ects 7.7 per cent of all observations. To address this problem, we construct 36 cells based on education, gender and year. For each cell, a tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent variable and individual and establishment covariates as well as industry dummies as explanatory variables (see Table 1 below). As described in Gartner (2005) , rightcensored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower) truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system. After this imputation procedure, nominal wages are de ‡ated by the Consumer Price Index of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce Germany normalised to 1 in 2000. 9 Note that the exclusion of certain individual groups entails a loss of 22 establishments. 10 The categories are: No degree, vocational training degree, high school degree (Abitur ), high school degree and vocational training, technical college degree and university degree. Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described in Fitzenberger et al. (2005) . This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
Turning to the establishment variables, the main variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis are de…ned as follows. Following the majority of the rent-sharing literature (see e.g. see Lemieux 1993, van Reenen 1996) , establishment pro…tability, , is measured by per-capita quasi-rents. We choose quasi-rents -de…ned as value-added minus the opportunity cost of labour -for two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective quasi-rents may be interpreted as representing the 'pie'to be divided between the bargaining parties. Second, from an econometric perspective, the use of quasi-rents instead of pro…ts enables us to circumvent the endogeneity problem induced by the accounting relationship between wages and pro…ts. In particular, we construct per capita quasi-rents as the di¤erence between annual sales, material costs and the alternative annual wagebill divided by establishment size, so that
Establishment size (SIZE) is calculated as the number of employees reported for the month June averaged over the present and preceding year. The alternative wagebill, w SIZE, is de…ned as the annual wagebill which each …rm would incur if it had to pay the average industrial wage. Thus, we approximate w by the weighted average of industry-speci…c wages for blue-and white-collar workers (separately for West and East Germany), with the weights being the establishment-speci…c shares of those worker groups in the total work force. 11 The fractions of blue-and white-collar workers are taken from the establishment data because the Employment Statistics Register provides the individual employment status only for full-time workers. All monetary values are expressed as real values by de ‡ating them with a sector-speci…c producer price index normalised to 1 in 2000. Industry-speci…c price indices and wages are obtained from the Federal Statistical O¢ ce Germany and are matched to the establishment-data on the basis of a two-digit sector classi…cation.
Note that the pro…tability measure does not account for capital costs, because our data lack explicit information on such costs. However, we attempt to control for di¤erences in capital intensities. As we do not directly observe the capital stock, we need to construct a proxy. We measure capital by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the capital value in the …rst observation year and using the information on expansion investment in the following years. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing investment expenditures in each establishment's …rst observation
year by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g; and a depreciation rate of capital,
: 12 Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by adding real expansion investment expenditures. 13 To obtain real values, nominal investment expenditures are de ‡ated by the producer price index of investment goods of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce Germany. The capital-labour ratio, K=L, is constructed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size. Finally, further establishment variables include the existence of a works council as well as information on industry-speci…c and …rm-speci…c collective bargaining coverage. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent analysis. The …rst two columns report statistics averaged over individuals, whereas the last two columns present statistics that are averaged over establishments. Note that both statistics partly di¤er substantially from each other due to the underlying distribution of establishment size. Because larger establishments pay on average higher wages and are more pro…table in terms of per-capita quasi-rents, the underlying sample means are lower on the establishment level. Moreover, there are also considerable di¤erences with respect to collective bargaining coverage. In particular, it can be seen that large establishments are much more likely to be covered by an industry-wide agreement, whereas small establishments are more likely to belong to the non-union sector. As a result, the overwhelming majority of individuals (88 per cent) are employed by an establishment that adopts an industry-wide agreement. The fraction of individuals in establishments that are subject to a …rm-speci…c agreement amounts to 8 per cent. Finally, only 4 per cent of all individuals are subject to no agreement at all, even though the fraction of non-covered establishments amounts to about 26 per cent. Breaking down the sample into those individual observations covered by an industry-wide agreement, a …rm-speci…c agreement and into those without any bargaining coverage reveals that wages are highest under industry-wide agreements and lowest without any bargaining coverage (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The variability in wages is higher for individuals without any bargaining coverage with a coe¢ cient of variation of 0.08 as compared to 0.06 and 0.07 for individuals who work in an establishment that is covered by a collective contract. Moreover, workers covered by …rm-speci…c agreements are, on average, employed by more pro…table …rms, followed by those working in …rms that are subject to an industry-wide agreement. 12 This involves the assumption that investment expenditures on capital have grown at a constant average rate, g; so that the capital stock in the base year is K 1 = I 0 + (1 )I 1 + (1 ) 2 I 2 + ::
In particular, to calculate K 1 , we set = 0:1 and g = 0:05 (see Hempell 2002) . 13 More speci…cally, K t = K t 1 (1 ) + I t 1 = K t 1 + EI t 1 ; where K t is the capital stock at the beginning of period t; i.e. at the end of period t 1, and EI t are expansion investment expenditures in period t: 13 5 Results
Estimation Strategy
We …rst focus on a simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) speci…cation of eq. (2), in which neither i nor j(i;t) are controlled for. The POLS estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modi…ed in various respects: First, we control for individual unobserved heterogeneity to assess the extent to which unobservably more productive workers work in more pro…table plants. Second, we address the possibility of unobserved plant-speci…c time invariant factors. Finally, we address the endogeneity of per-capita rents by using dynamic panel data methods. Table 2 reports the results from the POLS estimations of the impact of quasi-rents per worker on individual log wages. Quasi-rents are speci…ed in levels rather than logs, since the use of logs would have required discarding all observations with negative quasi-rents.
Pooled OLS-Results
In the …rst simplest model, which includes quasi-rents as the only explanatory variable, the estimate of quasi-rents per employee on the individual wage is 0.110. Adding individual characteristics increases the explanatory power of the model considerably (by a factor of more than six) and reduces the coe¢ cient to 0.059, suggesting that almost 50 per cent of the correlation between rents and wages is due to systematic sorting of workers across …rms (Model (2)). In particular, high-quali…ed workers appear to be associated with more pro…table …rms. The e¤ects of rents on wages are further reduced when including other establishment characteristics, such as establishment size, bargaining coverage, the existence of a works council and the capital-labour ratio (Model (3)). Apart from the capital-labour ratio K=L, all control variables enter the regression with their expected sign and are all signi…cant at the 1 per cent level. In line with earlier evidence, establishment size is found to have a signi…cant positive e¤ect on individual wages. 14 In the literature, a positive …rm size e¤ect is usually explained by di¤erences in pro…tability conditions, capital equipment, worker quality and monitoring costs among others (see e.g. Oi and Idson 1999). As our speci…cations explicitly control for worker quality, the capital-labour ratio and quasi-rents, the establishment size variable may be interpreted as capturing some part of unobserved worker quality and technology di¤erences. The e¤ects of quasi-rents on wages are further reduced after adding an eastwest dummy, which is in accordance with less favourable economic conditions in East German establishments (Model (4)). Moreover, controlling for establishment location leads to a larger and more precise estimate of the capital-labour ratio on wages, indicating systematic di¤erences in capital intensity across regions. Note that the coe¢ cients on CEN T and F IRM drop signi…cantly in Model (4), which re ‡ects the much lower extent of collective bargaining coverage among East German employers.
Given the predominance of industry-level wage bargaining, it might be conceivable that the positive e¤ect of quasi-rents on wages was primarily due to rent-sharing on the industry level. For this reason, we investigate whether the positive correlation is robust to the inclusion of 16 two-digit industry dummies (Model (5)). Controlling for industry a¢ liation increases the coe¢ cient on rents even somewhat, suggesting that the sensitivity of wages to quasi-rents estimated by Models (4) and (5) mainly refers to within industry rent-sharing.
Finally, our main interest concerns the question whether the rent-coe¢ cient varies systematically with collective bargaining coverage. To investigate this issue, Model (6) includes interactions between collective bargaining coverage and rents. The results indicate that the extent to which wages react to local pro…tability conditions is sig-ni…cantly lower in establishments that are covered by a centralised wage agreement. However, the null hypothesis of 0 = _CEN T can be rejected at conventional levels, suggesting that the overall impact of rents on wages is still positive. In establishments that are covered by a …rm-speci…c contract, wages do not appear to be less sensitive to rents as the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is found to be insigni…cant.
Individual …xed-e¤ects
Even though we have controlled for observable individual characteristics, it might be conceivable that the positive e¤ect of quasi-rents on individual wages was due to sorting of unobservably more productive workers into more pro…table establishments. To assess the extent to which sorting a¤ects our estimates, we next control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. First-di¤erencing of eq. (2) sweeps-out the individual e¤ect i :
Note that …rst-di¤erencing also eliminates individual time-constant characteristics u i , so that the coe¢ cient vector cannot be identi…ed. 15 Model (1) and (2) in Table  3 report the individual …rst-di¤erenced regressions results. The speci…cations include the full set of time-varying covariates from Model (5) and (6) in Table 2 . While Model (1) contains no interaction terms, Model (2) allows the coe¢ cients to vary with collective bargaining coverage. Note that the number of observations drops from 1,305,705 to 971,057 since we lose one observation for 331,442 individuals and two observations for those (1,603) whose time series exhibits a gap.
In Model (1), quasi-rents enter the equation with a positive sign, but the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant. Interestingly, in Model (2), where the e¤ect is allowed to vary with collective bargaining coverage, the coe¢ cients are more precisely estimated. While the coe¢ cient on quasi-rents is signi…cantly positive for non-covered establishments, the e¤ect is found to be signi…cantly lower under centralised wage agreements. In contrast to the POLS results, a Wald-test fails to reject the null 0 = _CEN T (with a p-value of 0.59), indicating that the overall e¤ect of rents on wages is even zero under centralised contracts. For …rm-speci…c contracts, the interaction term is found to be negative, but not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Overall, the estimated e¤ects of quasi-rents on wages are much lower than the POLS estimates. This …nding is indicative of some systematic sorting of unobservably more productive workers into more pro…table …rms. Given that the POLS upward-bias is found to be relatively larger under centralised agreements, sorting appears to play a major role for …rms that are covered by a centralised wage contract. One possible explanation might be that centralised wage contracts lead to a more compressed wage structure across skill groups which causes …rms to upgrade the quality of their workforce. For Germany, this is supported by evidence from Dustmann and Schönberg (2004) who …nd covered …rms to exhibit a more compressed wage structure and to provide more training than non-covered …rms. Note that this might lead to higher unobserved worker productivity in such …rms and therefore to (relatively larger) upward-biased estimates in the simple pooled OLS-speci…cation.
As regards the remaining establishment variables, in both speci…cations establishment size, the works council and the east-west dummy are found to be signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and enter the equations with their expected sign. Presumably due to their low variability over time, the collective bargaining dummies and the capital-labour ratio are imprecisely estimated and are for the most part incorrectly signed. 
Spell …xed-e¤ects
Apart from unobserved individual heterogeneity, a further source of bias may be the presence of unobserved establishment e¤ects that are correlated with our pro…tability measure. In our context, the presence of unobserved establishment heterogeneity may result from neglected capital costs in the quasi-rent measure as well as from di¤erences in technological conditions 16 that are not captured by our control variables. In this case, consistent estimates of the parameters of interest may be obtained by taking di¤erences within each individual-establishment combination (see Abowd et al. 1999 ). Andrews et al. (2005) label these combinations as individual-establishment-'spells'. De…ning s = i + j(i;t) in eq. (2) as the unobserved spell-level e¤ect for spell s, …rst-di¤erencing of eq. (2) yields:
Thus, …rst-di¤erencing of eq. (2) removes s ; as long as di¤erencing occurs within each spell. In addition to eliminating individual time-constant characteristics, …rst-di¤erencing sweeps out time-constant establishment variables q 0 j(i;t) , so that the coe¢cient vector cannot be identi…ed either. 17 The extent to which the spell …xed-e¤ects estimates di¤er from the individual …xed-e¤ects results depends on the fraction of individuals who move between establishments within our sample. In the extreme case of no turnover between sample establishments, spell-and individual …xed-e¤ects would yield the same results, and i and j(i;t) could not be separately identi…ed. Table 4 reports the distribution of the number of spells. The …gures show that the majority of individuals (99.84 per cent) do not move between establishments, only 526 out of 333,045 workers (corresponding to 0.16 per cent) move from one sample establishment to another. 18 Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 contain the results from the spell …rst-di¤erenced regressions. Since di¤erencing requires at least two consecutive time periods within each spell, we need to exclude 448 spells with only one observation per spell. The remaining number of spells is 333,125. Since one observation per spell is lost in …rst di¤erencing within each spell and 1,587 spells exhibit a gap in their time series, the number of observations drops to 970,545. As expected, due to the tiny proportion of individuals who change their employer, the estimates do not substantially di¤er from the individual …rst-di¤erenced estimates. As in speci…cation (2), quasi-rents are found to exert a signi…cantly lower impact on wages in establishments that are subject to a centralised wage contract (Model (4)). Similar to Model (2), a Wald-test fails to reject the null of a zero-rent coe¢ cient (with a p-value of 0.53). Although the point-estimate of the interaction term for …rm-speci…c contracts is negative, it is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Overall, our …ndings therefore suggest that centralised wage bargaining suppresses any wage dispersion due to diverging pro…tability conditions, whereas …rm-speci…c contracts and no collective bargaining coverage allow wages to respond to local pro…ts. Note that with spell level …xed-e¤ects, unobserved heterogeneity captures both individual and establishment e¤ects. An interesting issue would be to recover estimates of i and j(i;t) and to examine whether unobservably better individuals work in establishments that are characterised by (unobservable) high-wage policies. However, owing to the low proportion of movers in our sample we do not pursue this issue further, since for a large number of …rms such an iden-ti…cation would have to rely on very little information to obtain estimates of the establishment e¤ects.
The wage-pro…t correlation across various worker groups
Our earlier considerations on the individual determinants of rent-sharing suggested that the relationship between wages and quasi-rents might systematically di¤er across various worker groups. To test this notion, we additionally ran regressions separately by gender, occupation (blue-collar and white-collar workers) and skill-types. Table  5 reports the results for males and females and for blue-and white-collar workers. Columns (1) and (2) hold the results of the gender-speci…c regressions. For the female sample, we obtain a coe¢ cient in non-covered establishments which amounts to about 60 per cent of the corresponding point estimate for males. Even though the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant and may partly be attributed to gender 20 di¤erences in the skill-composition 19 , the lower point estimate for females may be interpreted as weak evidence for a lower rent-extraction of women. Note that this is consistent with former evidence obtained by Arai (2001) , Black and Strahan (2001) , Nekby (2003) and Martins (2004) among others. Given that the intercept e¤ect of works-councils is much more pronounced among male individuals, this …nding lends some support to the hypothesis that rent-sharing in non-covered establishments partly results from the local bargaining power of works councils who extract rents mainly on behalf of male workers. As to the interaction terms, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients exhibit the same pattern as in the pooled regressions. For each group, the null of 0 = _CEN T cannot be rejected (with p-values of 0.43 for males and 0.67 for females). Thus, industry-wide wage agreements appear to reduce inter-…rm wage di¤erentials both for men and women to a similar extent, indicating that the extent of inter-…rm wage compression under centralised contracts is stable across both groups. Moreover, similar to the pooled regressions, the interaction terms for …rm-speci…c contracts are found to be not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and this result holds for either group.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results for blue-and white-collar workers. First of all, the point estimates in non-covered establishments are slightly larger for bluecollar workers. Thus, the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis due to diverging supervision intensities does not receive much support, because such mechanisms led us to expect the relationship between wages and quasi-rents to be larger among white-collar workers. The results rather con…rm the works-council bargaining power hypothesis as the e¤ect of works councils on the mean wage turns out to be largest for bluecollar workers. As to the interaction terms, centralised contracts appear to reduce rent-sharing particularly among blue-collar workers. Among white-collar workers, the interaction e¤ect is less negative and not statistically di¤erent from zero. While the null of zero rent-sharing under centralised contracts cannot be rejected for blue-collar workers (with a p-value of 0.82), this hypothesis is to be rejected at conventional levels for white-collar workers. This …nding lends some support to our hypothesis that inter-…rm wage di¤erentials of blue-collar workers are more likely to be compressed by centralised contracts than those of white-collar workers. Table 6 reports separate regression results for di¤erent skill-types. As before, in non-covered establishments quasi-rents are found to exert a positive impact on wages. Note, however, that due to the smaller sample size the estimates for low-and highskilled workers are much more imprecise than those for medium-skilled workers. As hypothesized earlier, e¢ ciency wage mechanisms and bargaining power considerations lead us to expect the relationship between wages and quasi-rents to be particularly pronounced among the better educated. Although the estimates in non-covered establishments do not signi…cantly di¤er from each other, the higher point estimates suggest the pro…t-e¤ect on wages to be larger among higher skill groups. Again, when choosing among the alternative explanations, the results appear to favour the works-council argument. The reason is that the rent-sharing e¤ect is largest for the medium-skilled, whose mean wage outcomes bene…t the most from the existence of a works council. As regards bargaining coverage, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients exhibit the same pattern as in the pooled regressions. As before, the interaction e¤ects for …rm-speci…c contracts are found to be very small and not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and this is true for each skill group. Industry-wide wage agreements seem to reduce inter-…rm wage di¤erentials for all skill groups, even though the interaction e¤ect is found to be signi…cant only for medium-skilled workers. The overall e¤ect of quasi-rents on wages under centralised contracts is largest for high-skilled workers (with a point estimate of about 0.007). Even though the estimated e¤ect is very imprecise, this result may be interpreted as weak evidence for a more pronounced inter-…rm wage dispersion among high-skilled workers as compared to their low-and medium-skilled counterparts. This …nding is supportive of the notion that inter-…rm wage di¤erentials of high-skilled workers are less prone to be compressed by centralised wage agreements than those of low-and medium-skilled workers, since the latter are much more likely to be covered by collective contracts.
Given that 70 per cent of all non-covered establishments in our sample are located in East Germany, a further concern might be that the pattern of responses to local pro…tability conditions is driven by systematic regional di¤erences in wage formation. To investigate this issue, we ran separate regressions for East and West-German establishments. The regressions yielded coe¢ cients of 0.008, -0.005 and 0.007 for West Germany and 0.015, -0.021 and -0.011 for East Germany (for no-coverage, centralised contracts and …rm-speci…c contracts, respectively). Even though the Eastern sample is much smaller than the Western sample (125,089 versus 845,456 observations), the coe¢ cients for Eastern establishments are all signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, whereas the estimates for West Germany are all found to be insigni…cant. This exercise leads us to conclude that centralised contracts seem to suppress inter-…rm wage di¤erentials in either region, while the pro…t-sensitivity of wages in non-covered establishments is much more pronounced in East Germany.
Endogeneity bias
Even though the use of quasi-rents instead of pro…ts mitigates the endogeneity problem induced by the negative accounting relationship between wages and pro…ts, our pro…tability measure might still be endogenous. A …rst source of bias is a standard simultaneity bias which occurs if wages, output and quasi-rents are jointly determined. In general, the direction of bias can go either way and largely depends on the underlying relationship between output and employment. If there are, for example, decreasing returns in the use of labour, high wages will cause quasi-rents per worker to increase, and this will induce an upward-bias in the estimates of the rent-coe¢ cient (see Abowd and Lemieux 1993) . Second, because alternative wages and individual wages are likely to be positively correlated, there will always be some source of downward bias. The potential endogeneity of the pro…tability measure raises the question as to whether the pattern of previous results holds if the endogeneity of quasi-rents is accounted for. For example, an important concern might be that the invariance of wages against local pro…tability conditions under centralised contracts was simply caused by a downward-bias due the endogeneity of quasi-rents. To address this problem, we apply the di¤erenced Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . By exploiting available moment conditions around the error term, this estimator instruments endogenous variables with suitable lagged values. In particular, …rst di¤erencing of eq. (1) causes any …rst-di¤erenced endogenous variable x it 1 to become correlated with the error term u it : In the absence of second-order correlation in the error term, x it 2 and earlier lags will provide suitable instruments, since they will be uncorrelated with u it . Note that in our speci…cations, not only quasi-rents, but also their interactions with collective bargaining coverage are likely to be endogenous variables.
Apart from instrumenting endogenous variables by their lagged values in t 2 and earlier, the di¤erenced GMM estimator provides an appropriate treatment of predetermined variables which are assumed to be uncorrelated with u it and u it+1 ; but are correlated with u it 1 : As …rst di¤erencing causes such variables to become correlated with the error term u it , they are instrumented by lagged values in t 1 and earlier. In particular, we allow establishment size and the capital-labour ratio to be predetermined in order to capture potential feedback e¤ects from wages in period t on those covariates in subsequent periods. To test the validity of the moment conditions, we present the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. This test statistic calculates the correlation of the error terms with the instrument matrix and has an asymptotic 2 distribution under the null that the moment conditions are valid. Moreover, we report diagnostics for second-order serial correlation of the error terms (testing the null of no second-order serial correlation). Table 3 . Results are reported for the one-step GMM-estimator. Table 7 gives the results of the di¤erenced GMM estimates. 20 The estimates reported in Column (1) use lagged values of quasi-rents and their interactions with collective bargaining coverage in t 2 and earlier as instruments. Turning to the main variables of interest, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients exhibit a similar pattern as the individual and spell …xed-e¤ects estimates in Table 3 . While the rent-coe¢ cient is signi…cantly positive for non-covered establishments, wages appear to be less sensitive to rents if establishments are covered by a centralised wage agreement. Compared to the …xed-e¤ects estimates, the point estimate for non-covered establishments turns out to be somewhat larger, suggesting that the endogeneity of quasi-rents led to a slight downward bias in the …xed-e¤ects estimates. Note that the overall e¤ect under centralised agreements appears to be even negative, since a Wald-test rejects the null of 0 = _CEN T at conventional levels. Interestingly, the interaction term for …rm-speci…c contracts is estimated to be signi…cantly positive, once the endogeneity of quasi-rents is accounted for. Note that this is supportive of our hypothesis that …rm-speci…c contracts ought enable strong sector unions to skim o¤ a larger share of rents than wage-setting acteurs in non-covered establishments. Overall, these results indicate that the …xed-e¤ects estimates neglecting the endogeneity of quasi-rents led to a downward biased estimate of the rent-coe¢ cient under …rm-speci…c contracts and in non-covered establishments and to an upward-biased coe¢ cient under centralised contracts. Note, however, that the overall performance of the GMM estimates turns out to be somewhat disappointing, since the speci…cation obviously fails to pass the test of overidentifying restrictions and the AR(2)-test.
Given that lagged values in t 2 do not appear to be valid instruments for quasirents and their interactions with collective bargaining coverage, we ran an additional speci…cation using lagged values since t 3 and earlier as instruments (reported in Column (2)), and a further model using lagged values since t 4 and earlier (reported in Column (3)). The estimates yield somewhat larger rent coe¢ cients (for centralised contracts in absolute value). However, the Sargan statistics again fail to con…rm the validity of the moment conditions in either speci…cation. In sum, this leads us to judge the general performance of the GMM estimates to be rather unsatisfactory. These objections notwithstanding, the estimates do at least appear to preserve the pattern of results obtained by the …xed-e¤ects estimates and point to a remarkably stable pattern of the responsiveness of wages to pro…ts. In particular, the estimates indicate that a positive e¤ect of rents on wages prevails only in noncovered establishments and under …rm-speci…c contracts. As to the negative rent-e¤ect under centralised contract, we do not want to over-interpret this …nding. 21 Yet, it gives us some con…dence that the lower responsiveness of wages to local conditions under centralised contracts was not simply caused by a downward-bias due to the endogeneity of quasi-rents. The established pattern partly corroborates our results from recent work on the basis of establishment level data, where we failed to detect any positive relationship between wages and establishment-speci…c quasi-rents under centralised contracts. However, in …nding a positive amount of rent-sharing under …rm-speci…c contracts, the present results stand in contrast to our earlier …ndings from the establishment-level estimations, which pointed to a complete insensitivity of wages to local conditions under …rm-speci…c contracts (Gürtzgen 2005) . Note that this di¤erence may partly be attributed to the more precise and encompassing information on wages in the LIAB data, where wages are measured inclusive of fringe-bene…ts or bonus payments.
Given the coe¢ cients of 0.015 to 0.031 and mean quasi-rents per employee of 0.73, the elasticity of individual wages with respect to quasi-rents is of the magnitude 0.01 to 0.02 in non-covered plants. In establishments subject to a …rm-contract, elasticities range from 0.02 to 0.07 (with coe¢ cients ranging from 0.013 and 0.055 and a mean value of 1.22). Is is interesting to note that these …gures are remarkably similar to other estimates obtained with linked employer-employee data: Margolis and Salvanes (2001) …nd elasticities between 0.002 and 0.03 for France and corresponding values of 0.006 between 0.01 for Norway. The relative magnitude of these elasticities largely re ‡ect di¤erences in bargaining institutions in both countries, with …rm-level bargaining prevailing in France and a two-ladder system with sector-level bargaining and subsequent …rm-level negotiations being predominant in Norway. A similar system prevails in Sweden, which is consistent with comparable estimates obtained by Arai (2003) , who reports an elasticity of 0.01. Finally, Martins (2004) reports elasticities ranging between -0.031 and 0.078 for Portugal, which is characterised by a mixed bargaining system of sectoral, single-…rm and multi-…rm contracts.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: First, we have addressed the question of whether German wages respond to …rm-speci…c pro…tability conditions and second, we have been interested in whether the sensitivity of wages to …rm-speci…c rents depends on collective bargaining coverage. Theoretical considerations lead us to expect the sensitivity of wages to …rm-speci…c rents to be larger under …rm-speci…c contracts than in non-covered …rms. The same is likely to hold for industry-wide agreements, provided the bargaining parties make use of ‡exibility provisions, which recently have become a widespread element of central wage agreements. Since direct information on the use of ‡exibility provisions in …rms subject to an industry-wide wage agreement is unavailable, we take our empirical …ndings as indirect evidence of whether the use of such provisions is a quantitatively important phenomenon in Germany.
Using linked employer-employee data from the mining and manufacturing sector, our empirical analysis o¤ers a remarkably consistent picture: Individual wages are found to be positively related to quasi-rents, but this seems to be con…ned to the nonunion sector and to establishments subject to …rm-speci…c contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, appear to suppress any positive responsiveness of wages to local pro…tability conditions. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe¢ cient of zero. Moreover, the pooled OLS upward-bias is found to be relatively larger under centralised contracts. This …nding is indicative of the presence of unobserved factors that are positively related with pro…ts and impact positively upon wages, and which are particularly relevant under centralised contracts. One such factor may be that a compressed wage structure under centralised wage contracts causes …rms to upgrade the quality of their workforce. This might lead to higher unobserved worker productivity in such …rms and therefore to (relatively larger) upward-biased estimates in the simple pooled OLS-speci…cation. Di¤erenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our pro…tability measure even point to a negative relationship between wages and local pro…tability under centralised contracts. This leads us to conclude that the lower responsiveness of wages to local pro…tability conditions under centralised contracts does not simply result from a downward-bias due to the endogeneity of quasi-rents. Moreover, we …nd wages under …rm-speci…c contracts to react stronger to quasi-rents than in non-covered establishments, once the endogeneity of quasi-rents is accounted for. This …nding is supportive of our hypothesis that …rm-speci…c contracts ought enable strong sector unions to skim o¤ a larger share of rents than, for example, works councils in non-covered establishments.
In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the wage-pro…t relationship, our …ndings therefore suggest that centralised wage bargaining suppresses any positive responsiveness to …rm-speci…c pro…tability conditions and that the use of ‡exibility provisions in central wage agreements appears to be empirically negligible. Even though …rms may pay wages above the going rate and may make use of optout clauses, this potential for positive adjustments to local pro…tability conditions seems to be largely unused. To reconcile this result with the fact that a considerable fraction of …rms covered by a collective contract pay wages above the going rate, we conclude from our …ndings that such wages do not arise from more favourable pro…tability conditions, but rather re ‡ect observable and unobservable di¤erences in 29 worker productivity.
Consistent with our hypotheses that the extent of inter-…rm wage compression under centralised contracts ought to be particularly pronounced among those workers who are likely to be covered by collective contracts, we …nd the wages of low-and medium-skilled blue-collar workers to be most insensitive to local pro…ts. In noncovered establishments, we …nd medium-skilled and male workers to bene…t to a larger extent from their employers'ability-to-pay than unskilled and female workers, which lends support to the hypothesis that rent-sharing in non-covered plants mainly results from the bargaining power of works councils.
A Appendix
A. 
